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ABSTRACT
Pulsed Nuclear Space Propulsion, researched in the 1950s
and 1960s by such eminent physicists as Freeman Dyson, Ted
Taylor, Theodore von Karman, and Hans Bethe, involves propelling large spacecraft using compact nuclear explosions from
specialized atomic devices. This technology is often known by
the name of the Air Force project in which it was developed:
Orion.
It has long been believed that the 1962 Limited Test Ban
Treaty prohibits the use of nuclear pulse space propulsion. After
a survey of the Orion project and its results and a review of the
applicable law, this Article concludes that language in the 1967
Outer Space Treaty may override the Test Ban agreement to
permit non-weapons use of nuclear explosives for propulsion.
With a new space race taking place and with important actors
such as China not subject to the Test Ban Treaty at all, the subject of pulsed nuclear space propulsion deserves another look.
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We hope that this Article serves as a springboard for further
discussion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR THERMAL
ROCKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. PULSED NUCLEAR PROPULSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. ORION IN THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. PROBLEMS FOR ORION UNDER THE OUTER
SPACE TREATY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. PROBLEMS FOR ORION UNDER THE LIMITED
TEST BAN TREATY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. FISSION AND FALLOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII. CURRENT CONSEQUENCES FROM
TRANSPORTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IX. FALLOUT REDUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X. FALLOUT AS “CONTAMINATION” UNDER THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
XI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

446
449
451
457
459
462
464
467
469
471
475

INTRODUCTION

A

FTER A LONG HIATUS, the world is entering a new space
race. The United States is home to rapid progress in commercial space launch capability and has made plans for a rapid
return to the Moon. Trips to Mars are also being treated seriously. Companies are pursuing the exploitation of asteroid resources propelled by, in the words of Harvard Smithsonian
astrophysicist Martin Elvis, love, fear, and greed.1
Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China is proceeding aggressively with a new space station and another one under development,2 as well as missions to the Moon3 and Mars4 that are
See generally MARTIN ELVIS, ASTEROIDS: HOW LOVE, FEAR, AND GREED WILL DEOUR FUTURE IN SPACE 2 (2021).
2 See Andrew Jones, China’s Tiangong Space Station, SPACE.COM (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://www.space.com/tiangong-space-station [https://perma.cc/M35Y-64PR]
(“In May 2021, China launched Tianhe, the first of the orbiting space station’s
three modules, and the country aims to finish building the station by the end of
2022. CMSA [Chinese Manned Space Agency] hopes to keep Tiangong inhabited
continuously by three astronauts for at least a decade. The space station will host
many experiments from both China and other countries.”).
3 Dan Hastings, China to Soon Land on the Moon Before NASA – ‘Aggressive Competitor’, EXPRESS, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1519733/china-moon1
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widely seen as precursors to human missions. China is actively
researching designs for enormous space stations and spacecraft
hundreds or over a thousand meters long.5 Even countries such
as New Zealand6 and Luxembourg7 are getting into the act.
So far, these space efforts have involved chemical rockets, and
newer programs—in particular, SpaceX’s, which has already
lowered launch costs to low Earth orbit by a factor of twenty8—
promise substantially increased capabilities compared to the
Space Shuttle or the big Russian and American expendable
boosters of Cold War vintage.
Given what is known about such future vehicles as SpaceX’s
Starship/Super Heavy combination,9 it seems plausible that lunar and Martian bases and colonies will be established with reusable chemical rockets as the major source of propulsion.
Chemical rockets have inherent limits, however, and NASA,
along with various space agencies of other nations, have begun
landing-before-NASA-aggressive-competitor-ont [https://perma.cc/L3M72G9M] (Nov. 11, 2021, 9:00 AM).
4 Arjun Kharpal, China Plans to Send Its First Crewed Mission to Mars in 2033 and
Build a Base There, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-tosend-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html [https://perma.cc/U4W3SE4Q] (June 24, 2021, 11:41 AM).
5 Georgina Torbet, China Will Study How to Build a Massive Spacecraft over a HalfMile Long, DIGIT. TRENDS (Aug. 28, 2021), https://www.digitaltrends.com/news/
china-one-kilometer-spacecraft/ [https://perma.cc/SX35-TW5M].
6 New Zealand hosted a launch site for startup space company Rocket Lab. See
Jeff Foust, Rocket Lab Launches Two BlackSky Satellites, Wins Synspective Contract,
SPACENEWS (Dec. 9, 2021), https://spacenews.com/rocket-lab-launches-twoblacksky-satellites-wins-synspective-contract/ [https://perma.cc/KDH3-WEV2];
see also Business Wire, Rocket Lab Launches 109th Satellite to Orbit, YAHOO FIN. (Dec.
8, 2021), https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/rocket-lab-launches-109th-satellite021900337.html [https://perma.cc/2UK4-LVUB] (“Rocket Lab has three launch
pads at two launch sites, including two launch pads at a private orbital launch site
located in New Zealand . . . .”).
7 Luxembourg,
a Rising Star in the Space Industry, DELOITTE, https://
www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/technology/articles/luxembourg-space-industry-companies.html [https://perma.cc/CE5A-9BAP].
8 Wendy Whitman Cobb, How SpaceX Lowered Costs and Reduced Barriers to Space,
CONVERSATION (Mar. 1, 2019, 6:39 AM), https://theconversation.com/howspacex-lowered-costs-and-reduced-barriers-to-space-112586 [https://perma.cc/
NG5Y-AX8F] (“When the space shuttle was in operation, it could launch a
payload of 27,500 kilograms for $1.5 billion, or $54,500 per kilogram. For a
SpaceX Falcon 9, the rocket used to access the ISS, the cost is just $2,720 per
kilogram.”).
9 See generally Joey Roulette, What is Starship? SpaceX Builds Its Next-Generation
Rocket, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/article/elon-muskstarship.html [https://perma.cc/8QQY-EU2K].
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thinking about nuclear space propulsion.10 Nuclear thermal
rockets, in which a radioactive core heats gases to provide
thrust, have been known since the 1960s, and while none have
flown in space, engines have been tested on the ground and the
technology is well understood.11 Nor are such rockets especially
controversial beyond the baseline of controversy that arises
whenever the word “nuclear” is employed.12
There is, however, another more powerful form of nuclear
space propulsion: pulsed nuclear space propulsion. It too has
never been tested in space, though much research and engineering were done on Earth in a project involving such eminent
physicists as Freeman Dyson, Ted Taylor, Hans Bethe, Theodore
von Karman, and others.13 If nuclear thermal rockets provide
the prospect for much more efficient space transport, pulsed
nuclear propulsion provides the prospect for utterly gamechanging capabilities, potentially allowing a nation that adopts it
to leapfrog the competition by orders of magnitude.
Some important questions stem from the fact that the “pulse”
in pulsed nuclear propulsion is an atomic explosion, albeit a
small and focused one.14 Among those issues are legal questions,
mainly involving the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies15 (Outer Space
10 See Accelerating Deep Space Travel with Space Nuclear Propulsion Before Subcomm.
on Space & Aeronautics of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech. (2021) (opening
statement of Bhavya Lal, Senior Advisor for Budget and Finance, NASA), https:/
/science.house.gov/hearings/accelerating-deep-space-travel-with-space-nuclearpropulsion [https://perma.cc/D59J-NT7J] (“If we want to explore the cosmos . . . we need to develop mass-efficient, high-energy solutions that can power
space vehicles . . . Nuclear fission systems can provide such solutions . . .”).
11 See 6 Things You Should Know About Nuclear Thermal Propulsion, OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/
ne/articles/6-things-you-should-know-about-nuclear-thermal-propulsion [https:/
/perma.cc/4LQ7-MWW6].
12 See, e.g., 10 Reasons to Oppose Nuclear Energy, GREEN AM., https://
www.greenamerica.org/fight-dirty-energy/amazon-build-cleaner-cloud/10-reasons-oppose-nuclear-energy [https://perma.cc/L634-GV4E].
13 GEORGE DYSON, PROJECT ORION: THE TRUE STORY OF THE ATOMIC SPACESHIP
91 (2002). For an excellent and technically detailed history of this project, see
generally id.
14 G.R. SCHMIDT, J.A. BONOMETTI & P.J. MORTON, NUCLEAR PULSE PROPULSION ORION AND BEYOND 2–3 (2000).
15 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].

2022]

PULSED NUCLEAR SPACE PROPULSION

449

Treaty) and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 196316 (Test Ban
Treaty). This Article will outline the nature and capabilities of
pulsed nuclear propulsion and the reasons why it may prove
enormously tempting in the context of an all-out space race. It
will then explore the extent to which existing space law poses
barriers to this technology and what nations seeking to employ
the technology might do in response.
II.

CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR THERMAL ROCKETS

Rocket engines are basically heat engines.17 In a chemical
rocket, the combustion of a fuel and oxidizer—for example, hydrogen and oxygen, or even gunpowder18—generates heat,
which causes a rapid expansion of gases.19 If those gases are propelled out the back of the engine, the action/reaction principle
of Newton’s third law causes the rocket to move forward.20 In a
nuclear thermal rocket, the heat is provided by the reactor. A
fluid medium (such as liquid hydrogen) can be superheated by
passing it through the reactor core.21 What follows is the same
process that occurs in a chemical rocket—the rapidly expanding
16 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
Test Ban Treaty].
17 MARTIN J.L. TURNER, ROCKET AND SPACECRAFT PROPULSION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 35 (2d ed. 2006). It is possible to utilize the rocket
principle while employing methods other than heat to drive the reaction mass—
for example, electromagnetic catapults shooting reaction mass out the back and
ion engines are not precisely heat engines—but as a general description, this
statement is accurate. See generally Tim Wright, How Things Work: Electromagnetic
Catapults, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 2007), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/airspace-magazine/how-things-work-electromagnetic-catapults-14474260/ [https://
perma.cc/VQD9-S55R]; Ion Propulsion, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/
glenn/about/fs21grc.html [https://perma.cc/9N3K-NBC3] (Aug. 6, 2017).
18 Gunpowder contains its own fuel in the form of charcoal and sulfur, and it
has an oxidizer in the form of potassium nitrate, commonly known as saltpeter.
See generally Gunpowder, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/casa/learn/historyculture/gunpowder.htm [https://perma.cc/AM6A-9CE3] (May 4, 2015); see
also Saltpetre, ENCYC. BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/science/saltpeter
[https://perma.cc/2SZ9-WPPJ] (Aug. 15, 2022).
19 Combustion, GLENN RSCH. CTR., NASA, https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/
airplane/combst1.html#:~:text=Combustion%20is%20a%20chemical%20process,fuel%20is%20usually%20a%20liquid [https://perma.cc/G6QF-WK3Z] (May
13, 2021).
20 See Newton’s Laws of Motion, GLENN RSCH. CTR., NASA, https://www1.grc.
nasa.gov/beginners-guide-to-aeronautics/newtons-laws-of-motion [https://
perma.cc/594B-D2KZ].
21 See OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 11.
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gases are propelled out the back, Newton’s third law takes effect,
and the rocket moves forward.
Nuclear thermal rockets are far more efficient than chemical
rockets. Efficiency is measured by “specific impulse,” with higher
numbers indicating greater efficiency, and chemical rockets
tend to have specific impulses in the low hundreds.22 Nuclear
thermal rockets have specific impulses in the thousands.23 Some
other rocket engines, such as ion rockets, have even higher specific impulses, but at the price of producing very weak thrust.24
Chemical rockets can produce much higher thrusts than ion engines but at low efficiency.25 Nuclear thermal rockets can produce much higher thrust at a high level of efficiency, making
them much more appealing for space voyages that would take
too long, or require too limited a payload, with chemical rocket
propulsion.26 The original post-Apollo Mars mission plans involved nuclear thermal engines, and NASA and the Department
of Energy conducted numerous experiments in the 1960s and
1970s, test-firing working engines in projects including NERVA
and Kiwi.27 Though the engineering was sophisticated—nuclear
rocket science is still rocket science—the principles were well
understood, and implementation was comparatively straightforward.28 Yet nuclear thermal rockets have their own limits in

22 Robert A. Braeunig, Basics of Space Flights: Propellants, ROCKET & SPACE TECH.,
http://www.braeunig.us/space/propel.htm?fbclid=IWAR3B__RA9AyaVg0
PEaTwG75Fr6NUK2JSqgYtMO2ifDUWZNO5P9-uVCYiJkw [https://perma.cc/
WBX3-9ZZN].
23 See ANNE CHARMEAU, BRANDON CUNNINGHAM & SAMIM ANGHAIE, ULTRAHIGH
SPECIFIC IMPULSE NUCLEAR THERMAL PROPULSION 29–31 (2009).
24 Ion Propulsion: Farther, Faster, Cheaper, GLENN RSCH. CTR., NASA (May 2,
2008), https://www.nasa.gov/centers/glenn/technology/Ion_Propulsion1.html
[https://perma.cc/SB26-GT7U].
25 Id.; see also 3 Types of Chemical Rocket Engines, FIREHAWK (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.firehawkaerospace.com/news/3-types-of-chemical-rocket-engines
[https://perma.cc/FX4X-QJKN].
26 See CHARMEAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 29–31.
27 Beginning in 1964 with the Kiwi-B4D, through 1969 with the XE engine, the
U.S. government conducted dozens of tests on fifteen different models of nuclear thermal rocket engines. See KENNETH GATLAND, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF SPACE EXPLORATION
214–17 (1st ed. 1981) (listing nuclear thermal rocket tests that were conducted
and discussing plans for Mars missions using nuclear thermal propulsion).
28 See id. at 215–16 (explaining the basic principles and feasibility of nuclear
thermal rockets in the 1960s and 1970s, but also explaining why the project in
America was ultimately abandoned).
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terms of reaction mass and exhaust temperature that make
them not entirely satisfactory for ambitious missions.29
Now the U.S. government is funding new research into nuclear space propulsion as the United States enters into what
looks like a new “space race” with China.30 So far, that research—at least the research that has been made public—involves nuclear thermal propulsion.31 But there is another way.
III.

PULSED NUCLEAR PROPULSION

Pulsed nuclear propulsion was also studied in the early years
of the space age. Even in pre-space years, physicist Stanislaw
Ulam proposed using nuclear explosions to propel a spacecraft,32 and a nuclear “bomb” powered space vehicle was mentioned in Robert Heinlein’s 1940 (pre-nuclear era) story,
Blowups Happen.33 But in the late 1950s, as the Golden Age of
nuclear physics research was going on, General Atomics hired a
number of leading physicists to research and design a spacecraft
using this principle.34 The project was named Orion.35
29 EUGENE F. MALLOVE & GREGORY L. MATLOFF, THE STARFLIGHT HANDBOOK: A
PIONEER’S GUIDE TO INTERSTELLAR TRAVEL 57 (1989) (“Chemical rockets are severely limited by energy; for all their storm and fury they are quite puny . . .
Nuclear [thermal] fission rockets—potentially much richer in energy—are, like
their chemical rocket cousins, severely constrained in performance by temperature limits. The most advanced imaginable materials and cooling systems place
an upper cap on [thermal] fission nuclear rocket specific impulse. Ion engines,
on the other hand, are power-limited rather than temperature limited . . . It
almost seemed that nature had ‘rigged the deck’ with these Scylla and Charybdis
problems: too much temperature or too little energy or power. To save the day,
enter pulsed nuclear propulsion . . . ”).
30 See Mark Lewis, Back to the Future with Nuclear Power in Space, BREAKING DEF.
(Sept. 22, 2021, 7:03 AM), https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/back-to-thefuture-with-nuclear-power-in-space/ [https://perma.cc/D5YV-UP4X] (discussing
the U.S. government’s renewed interest in nuclear propulsion); Stephen Chen,
China’s Space Programme Will Go Nuclear to Power Future Missions to the Moon and
Mars, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 24, 2021, 11:00 PM), https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/science/article/3157213/chinas-space-programme-will-go-nuclear-power-future-missions [https://perma.cc/ZN58-UBJH].
31 Lewis, supra note 30.
32 See DYSON, supra note 13, at 22–24.
33 See ROBERT HEINLEIN, BLOWUPS HAPPEN (1940), available at https://metallicman.com/laoban4site/blowups-happen-full-text-by-robert-heinlein/ [https://
perma.cc/7VHS-8VW2].
34 Cf. Jeremy Bernstein, Reflections on Project Orion, 5 INFERENCE 1, 3 (2020),
https://inference-review.com/assets/pdf/articles/reflections-on-projectorion.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD4R-VVNY] (recounting the history of the project and naming several notable physicists that were involved in it).
35 See id.
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Earlier nuclear tests had revealed that graphite-covered steel
objects could survive within a few feet of a nuclear detonation,
despite the tremendously hot (over 100,000 degrees) temperatures present.36 A thin layer of stagnating plasma along the surface protected the object below.37 In some cases, these graphitecovered objects (big steel balls) were propelled a considerable
distance from the detonation site.38
It is not a tremendous surprise that when you set off an
atomic bomb next to something, that something will move.39
That it could also remain essentially intact, however, was considerably more surprising.40 The challenge for the Orion team was
to produce a spacecraft that could function after being subjected to not one but many nearby nuclear detonations and that
could be steered and navigated by an onboard crew.41
This turned out to be easier than it sounds. The Orion spacecraft design that resulted involved a large steel “pusher” plate
behind a rather large spacecraft with a total weight of over 4,000
tons.42 That sort of design is very different from the spaceships
we are used to today.43
In the old science-fiction movies, spaceships looked like, well,
ships. They had massive steel girders, thick bulkheads, and rivets
36 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Opinion, Cassini Was Great, but We Could Do Better If
America Wasn’t the Fussy Superpower, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2017/09/18/we-missed-opportunity-put-americans-saturn-1970glenn-reynolds-column/675060001/ [https://perma.cc/BWZ8-JNM3] (Sept. 18,
2017, 1:43 PM); see also LOS ALAMOS NAT’L LAB’Y, NATIONAL SECURITY SCIENCE: A
HALF CENTURY OF LOS ALAMOS IN SPACE 22–24 (2011), https://cdn.lanl.gov/
files/NSS-Issue1-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPT9-UNAR].
37 LOS ALAMOS NAT’L LAB’Y, supra note 36, at 27.
38 DYSON, supra note 13, at 68–71.
39 GLENN H. REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY
EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT AND OTHER
GOLIATHS 182 (2006).
40 Id.
41 See John Loeffler, Project Orion: The Atomic Starship that Never Got Off the
Ground, INTERESTING ENG’G (Aug. 01, 2021), https://interestingengineering.com/project-orion-the-atomic-starship-that-never-got-off-the-ground [https:/
/perma.cc/P3FL-UAAU].
42 See Andrew J. Dunlop, The Other Orion Spacecraft, LABROOTS (Apr. 17, 2015,
8:27 AM), https://www.labroots.com/trending/space/929/the-other-orionspacecraft [https://perma.cc/UPY4-UYW5] (“[Orion] would weigh roughly 4000
tons and have a crew of up to a hundred and fifty people . . . .”); SCHMIDT ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 4 (depicting Orion’s pusher-plate design); REYNOLDS, supra note
39, at 182.
43 See DYSON, supra note 13, at 2–4 (discussing differences between chemical
rockets and Orion).

2022]

PULSED NUCLEAR SPACE PROPULSION

453

everywhere. They also had big crews with bunks, staterooms, and
mess halls.44 Now we know better, of course—spaceships are not
big, massive constructions made of steel. They are cramped gossamer contraptions of composites and exotic alloys designed to
keep the weight down.45 Reynolds has previously described the
Orion spacecraft: “Orion was big, clunky, and mechanical[-]featuring springs, hydraulic shock absorbers, and other nineteenthcentury-style accoutrements. To handle the shock, it needed to
be big. It probably would have had rivets.”46
In theory, “one of the greatest appeals of Orion” was that over
a wide range, “the bigger you made it, the better it worked.”47 As
Reynolds has noted previously:
While chemical rockets scale badly—with big ones much harder
to build than small ones—Orion was just the opposite. That
meant that large spacecraft, capable of long missions, were not
merely possible, but actually easier to build, for a variety of reasons, than small ones. Bigger spaceships meant more mass for
absorbing radiation and shock, more room to store fuel, [a
smaller proportion of total size needed for radiation shielding,]
and so on.48

The Orion design achieved enormously high thrust, combined with enormously high efficiency.49 Given that atomic explosions are involved, the high thrust is not a surprise. The
efficiency, however, is staggering. While nuclear thermal rockets
might achieve a specific impulse of 2,000,50 Orion could at least
double that, while lifting something the size of a skyscraper into
orbit and accelerating it to speeds that no chemical or nuclear
thermal rocket could touch. Theoretical studies suggested that
specific impulses on the order of 10,000 to 100,000 were possi44 See generally Madison Troyer, 50 Best Space Movies of All Time, STACKER (Aug.
19, 2022), https://stacker.com/stories/3346/50-best-space-movies-all-time (discussing older science-fiction, space movies).
45 See, e.g., Orion, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/orionfirstflight/.
46 REYNOLDS, supra note 39, at 183.
47 Id.; see also DYSON, supra note 13, at 259 (“The Orion program, on paper,
worked better and better the bigger it got.”).
48 REYNOLDS, supra note 39, at 183.
49 See Stan Tackett, The Mini-Mag Orion Space Propulsion System, NUCLEAR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 25, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.ans.org/news/article-1313/minimag-orion/ [https://perma.cc/A5HB-MHQX].
50 Reaching a specific impulse of 2,000 is an aspirational goal for nuclear thermal rockets—most aim for a mere 900. See OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, supra note 11 (naming a specific impulse of 900 seconds as the “initial
target” for nuclear-powered rockets).
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ble,51 which would make Orion at least two orders of magnitude
more efficient than the most powerful chemical rockets.52
For a short, Apollo-style “flags and footprints” mission, Orion
was overkill. But for more serious large-scale and long-distance
exploration, it was very promising. The 1958 motto of the Orion
crew was “Saturn by 1970.”53 And they thought they could do it;
the physicists were already planning journeys and meeting with
the life-support engineers from the nuclear submarine builder
Electric Boat division (a division of General Atomics’ corporate
parent, General Dynamics) to draw on the expertise those engineers had developed in keeping people both alive and reasonably cheerful on round-the-world submerged cruises.54
To the big-name physicists working on the project in 1958, it
seemed like a dream—a way to use their extensive nuclear weapons expertise on something peaceful, something that would
open up the solar system to humanity, rather than on creating
ever more efficient tools for killing large numbers of people.55
Nuclear tests took place verifying the ability of the components
to survive nearby—it turned out that coating metallic objects
with non-metallic substances like Bakelite drastically improved
their resistance to the nuclear fireball, and working models were
tested.56 These were non-nuclear, but the nuclear aspects of the
project were considered less difficult than ensuring reliable ejection and detonation of the explosive devices and stability of the
craft when launching.57
51 See MALLOVE & MATLOFF, supra note 29, at 60–61, 64–66 (“[M]uch higher
specific impulse is possible, perhaps 104 to 106> seconds . . . Orion project reports spoke of estimated specific impulse in the range 2000 to 6000 seconds with
possible extension to the 10,000- to 20,000-second range in the succeeding
generation. . . .”).
52 See discussion supra Part II.
53 DYSON, supra note 13, at 6; see also FREEMAN DYSON, DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE
110 (1979) [hereinafter FREEMAN DYSON].
54 DYSON, supra note 13, at 76.
55 See, e.g., JOHN MCPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY: A JOURNEY INTO THE
AWESOME AND ALARMING WORLD OF THEODORE B. TAYLOR 180 (1974) (“We have
for the first time imagined a way to use the huge stockpiles of our bombs for
better purpose than for murdering people. My purpose, and my belief, is that the
bombs which killed and maimed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki shall one day open
the skies to man.”).
56 DYSON, supra note 13, at 71; see also FREEMAN DYSON, supra note 53, at 113
(describing flight tests of an experimental pulse ship named “Hot Rod” at Point
Loma, California).
57 DYSON, supra note 13, at 169–80.
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As John McPhee notes in his biography of one of the Orion
scientists, Ted Taylor:
No chemical rocket making slow ferries to the nearby moon was
ever going to hint at the vehicular capabilities necessary for enterprises on such a scale. Ted Taylor’s Orion was something quite
different, though. Large enough to carry machine shops and laboratories, it could move through space at about a hundred thousand miles an hour, top speed. Whenever the day might come
that people would earnestly wish to get about in the solar system,
this would be the way to do it.58

Things seemed auspicious, but it was not to be:
The subsequent development of nuclear pulse propulsion in theory and experiment was so promising that it seems only by
chance, politics, and extraordinary circumstances that today nuclear pulse powered spaceships are not zipping with ease across
the Solar System. If nuclear pulse propulsion development had
run its course, by now fast ships would be transporting people
and instruments among the planets while tortoiselike chemical
rockets stayed where they belong, in Earth orbit.59

As George Dyson notes regarding the years of research and
hardware testing, “[t]hroughout seven years of work, nothing
turned up that conflicted fundamentally with the optimism of
1958.”60 And he quotes Freeman Dyson: “The end result was a
rather firm technical basis for believing that vehicles of this type
could be developed, tested, and flown . . . The technical findings
of the project have not been seriously challenged by anybody. Its
major troubles have been, from the beginning, political.”61
Orion, in fact, faced non-technical obstacles that proved far
more formidable than the science and engineering involved.
One was bureaucratic; the other was legal; though the two were
intertwined.
MCPHEE, supra note 55, at 172.
MALLOVE & MATLOFF, supra note 29, at 60. Indeed, there were plans to expand Orion to a possible interstellar role. See Robert L. Forward, Ad Astra!, in
INTERSTELLAR TRAVEL AND MULTI-GENERATIONAL SPACESHIPS 29, 38 (Yoji Kondo,
Frederick C. Bruhweiler, John Moore & Charles Sheffield eds., 2003) (“Enough
work has been done on the concept, especially the survivability of the pusher
plate under repetitive nuclear blast shocks, to determine that nuclear pulse propulsion is a technologically feasible concept . . . These ideas for an interplanetary
rocket have been extrapolated into a design for a starship.”)
60 DYSON, supra note 13, at 256.
61 Id. (quoting Freeman J. Dyson, Death of a Project, 149 SCIENCE 141, 141
(1965) [hereinafter Freeman Dyson]).
58
59
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On the bureaucratic side, Orion had trouble finding a home.
The Air Force backed much of the early research but was not
interested in what was an essentially peaceful project.62 There
were some efforts to justify Orion as a way of creating an indestructible space nuclear deterrent that would do for the Air
Force what nuclear submarines had done for the Navy, leading
to a skeptical President John F. Kennedy inspecting an eightfoot-high model of an Orion space battleship festooned with
Minuteman missiles, but these efforts were never taken seriously.63 Meanwhile, NASA, already committed to Apollo, was uninterested in taking on another big project at the time,
particularly one that involved nuclear explosions.64
The other barrier was the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which forbids nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and outer space.65
Though it might well have been possible to negotiate an exception for things such as Orion, there was insufficient bureaucratic
support to make that happen.66 Freeman Dyson later wrote,
“[t]he, Test Ban Treaty of 1963, prohibiting nuclear explosions
in the atmosphere and in space, made Orion flights illegal.
Before one could revive Orion one would have to abrogate or
renegotiate the treaty.”67
This is widely believed but not necessarily correct, as we will
argue below. It is also worth noting that there are now spacefaring powers such as France, and particularly the People’s Republic of China, that have not signed or ratified the Test Ban
Treaty,68 or that might be quite willing to abrogate it, at least in
part, in the service of obtaining a dominant position in the new
space race.69
62 See Brent Ziarnick & Peter Garretson, Starfleet Was Closer than You Think,
SPACE REV. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2714/
1[https://perma.cc/9HTF-6XR9]; see also SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5–6.
63 DYSON, supra note 13, at 204–07, 221–22.
64 Id. at 264–69.
65 Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, art. I.
66 DYSON, supra note 13, at 234 (“Technically, one could rather easily have
made a test ban that would still allow Orion to develop as a non[-]secret project
with international support and that’s what we would have liked . . . But politically
it was just obviously absurd at that time.”).
67 FREEMAN DYSON, supra note 53, at 114.
68 See Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801313d9 [https://
perma.cc/LKH9-EZ6U].
69 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law in Transformation: Some
Observations, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69, 79 (2005).
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Another barrier might lie in language of the Outer Space
Treaty prohibiting the stationing of “nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space.70
Though this might seem a more potent barrier given that essentially every nation has joined the Outer Space Treaty,71 and withdrawing from it would be a far more fraught act, in fact, that
provision is no barrier to Orion-type spacecraft.72 And some related language in the Outer Space Treaty may even vitiate the
Limited Test Ban’s burdens.73 What is more, the emerging new
space race may give one or more national actors cause to develop this technology.
IV.

ORION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Though the United States continued research into Orion for
a few years after the adoption of the Limited Test Ban Treaty,74
that Treaty marked the end of any serious effort to build a working spacecraft. The continuing work was largely an effort to
wrap up research and archive its findings in the event that the
nation might want to deploy Orion at some later time.75 Many of
the project’s principals, as noted above, thought that the capabilities Orion represented were so dramatic that it would sooner
or later be needed.76
By the time of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s signing, the
pace of the “space race” had become much less urgent. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union were racing to reach the
Moon first,77 but in truth, each was probably more afraid of the
other one beating it out than actually desirous of being first itself. Whether or not we wanted missile bases and colonies on
the Moon, we certainly did not want our adversaries to have
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June
30, 2017), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/225-OuterSpace-Treaty-website-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLA6-77NL].
72 See discussion infra Part V.
73 See discussion infra Parts V–VI.
74 Orion research stopped in 1965, and the Test Ban Treaty is dated 1963.
Freeman Dyson, supra note 61, at 142.
75 DYSON, supra note 13, at 268–69.
76 See discussion supra Part III.
77 Adam Mann, What Was the Space Race? Origins, Events and Timeline,
SPACE.COM, https://www.space.com/space-race.html [https://perma.cc/8UTBFP3E].
70
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them in our place.78 The provisions of the 1967 Treaty essentially eliminated the stakes by taking them off the table.79 Missile
bases as well as “national appropriation” of the Moon and other
celestial bodies were banned.80 A curtailed Apollo program
made it to the Moon on momentum (though several missions
and virtually all of the Apollo Applications program were cancelled except for Skylab), but absent a major prize, the race did
not seem worth the effort.81 Both the United States and the Soviet Union backed off and reduced their (civilian) space efforts
dramatically.82
A half century later, things are happening again. Though not
driven by the same Cold War propaganda dynamics as the 1960s
space race, the new space race is heating up.83 It, too, will be
driven in part by national prestige but also by a desire for money
and military supremacy in a new sphere of human activity.84
In this new race, the capabilities offered by Orion are likely to
look tempting again. Using Orion technology, space stations big
enough to require dozens of launches for their construction
could be placed in orbit in a single mission.85 Likewise, a base
could be placed on the Moon, complete with crew, in one
launch.86 And, of course, military missions calling for extensive
hardware in space become much more feasible when it is possible to launch much more hardware at once.
In this sort of environment, governments—whether of the
United States, China, Russia, or other potential space powers
See id.
Glenn H. Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century, 25
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 230 (1992).
80 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, arts. II, IV.
81 WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH, A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF THE SPACE AGE 421–22 (1985) (describing abandonment of later plans for
Apollo missions and Apollo Applications, with retention of Skylab).
82 Id. at 429–30 (“[A]lmost two-thirds of all Soviet spacecraft [by the early
1970s] were presumptively military . . .”).
83 The New Space Race, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/explore/space/the-new-space-race/ [https://perma.cc/82A8-4KMB].
84 Id. In a post-Sputnik White House briefing, then-Vice President Richard
Nixon, displaying “technical knowledge greater than that of some of the panelists,” stressed the geopolitical impact of “a backward country coming up from
nowhere” to score a triumph in outer space. See MCDOUGALL, supra note 81, at
204.
85 See generally NASA, NASA’S PLAN FOR SUSTAINED LUNAR EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 7–9, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/a_sustained_lunar_presence_nspc_report4220final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR6RHLDE].
86 See generally id.
78
79
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such as India—may be tempted to deploy Orion spacecraft. In
doing so, they would face a number of legal arguments under
international law. But how big a barrier would those arguments
pose? At one level, not much of a barrier. When nations want
something badly enough, they are often willing to simply ignore
international law or to engage in specious arguments.87 In the
case of Orion, however, there are some not-so-specious responses to claims of international illegality.
V.

PROBLEMS FOR ORION UNDER THE OUTER SPACE
TREATY

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides that parties “undertake not to place in orbit around the [E]arth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station
such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”88 This would
seem to be a barrier for a spacecraft propelled by nuclear explosions. It is true that the Treaty’s ban on nuclear weapons is deliberately incomplete.89 Nuclear ballistic missiles pass through
space in flight, and there was no desire (at least on the part of
the United States and the Soviet Union) to have the Treaty ban
those,90 nor does the Treaty ban fractional orbital bombardment systems of the sort recently tested by the People’s Republic
of China.91 It is also arguable that an Orion craft that took off
See, e.g., James Fukazawa, Does the U.S. Space Force Violate the Outer Space
Treaty?, DENVER J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y (Apr. 28, 2020), http://djilp.org/does-the-us-space-force-violate-the-outer-space-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/93RD-FHYU].
88 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
89 See, e.g., Pavle Kilibarda, Space Law Revisited (2/3): Are Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibited in Space?, HUMANITARIAN L. & POL’Y. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://
blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/12/21/space-law-weapons-mass-destruction/
[https://perma.cc/CAX6-J88H].
90 See Daryl Kimball, The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace [https://perma.cc/2DYCK7WF] (Oct. 2020) (“The [Outer Space Treaty] . . . does not prohibit the launching of ballistic missiles, which could be armed with [weapons of mass destruction] warheads, through space.”).
91 A fractional orbital bombardment system, as its name suggests, places nuclear weapons in a less-than-complete orbit, thus remaining within the terms of
the Outer Space Treaty. See Bleddyn Bowen & Cameron Hunter, Chinese Fractional
Orbital Bombardment, ASIA-PAC. LEADERSHIP NETWORK 4 (2021), https://
cms.apln.network/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/FINALBowenHunterPolic
yBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/STB5-63XV] (“[A] FOBS [fractional orbital bombardment system] would not breach the [Outer Space Treaty] if it never completed an orbit and is technically ‘in transit’ in space[,] which is practically
permitted even if it did carry nuclear weapons.”). It is comparatively easy, how87
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from Earth and proceeded directly on a mission into deep space
would not be covered by the Treaty because it would not be in
orbit around the Earth or on a celestial body or “stationed” in
space, since “station” implies some sort of permanent position
or steady trajectory.92
But while such arguments may have some force, they are not
necessary where Orion is concerned. The Outer Space Treaty,
after all, only bans nuclear weapons.93 It does not ban nuclear
explosives as such. This is underscored, as Bin Cheng has suggested, by the language that pairs “nuclear weapons” with “other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction,” meaning that only nuclear weapons intended to cause mass destruction are covered,
and weapons powered by nuclear explosions—like bombpumped X-ray lasers used to shoot down ballistic missiles—
would arguably not be covered by the ban because they do not
cause mass destruction akin to that created by a traditional nuclear explosion.94
Regardless of that question, the nuclear explosives used to
power an Orion spacecraft have an even stronger argument for
legitimacy, which is that they are not weapons at all. Not only do
these nuclear explosives differ from traditional nuclear weapons
ever, to convert that fractional orbit into a complete orbit if desired. See generally
Tyler Rogoway, China Tested a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System That Uses a
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle: Report, DRIVE: WAR ZONE (Oct. 18, 2021, 3:06 PM), https:/
/www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/42772/china-tested-a-fractional-orbital-bombardment-system-that-uses-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle-report [https://perma.cc/
FT7L-85US].
92 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
93 Id. (it also bans weapons of mass destruction).
94 See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 465 (1997); see also
Stephen Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing
Reappraisal, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 114, 115, 117–18 (1973) (“The initial
problem presented by the Treaty is the lack of a definition of what constitutes a
‘nuclear weapon’ or a ‘weapon of mass destruction.’ It may be presumed that all
arms which utilize atomic energy in accomplishing their intended purpose, irrespective of their size or destructive force, would be regarded as nuclear weapons . . . Both paragraphs one and two of article IV express the underlying policy
of prohibiting only certain uses of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction
in outer space, yet not completely outlawing their use.”). Presumably, a peaceful
explosive used in a spacecraft’s propulsion system would not count as an “arm”
nor would it exert “destructive force.” See Reynolds, supra note 69, at 79
(“‘[W]eapons’ is a term of art. A nuclear bomb for the destruction of cities is a
weapon. But is a nuclear explosive intended for spacecraft propulsion a weapon?
Or simply a ‘device?’ It seems quite plausible to me—and certainly plausible
enough to satisfy a nation looking for legal cover—that the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit does not extend to such a circumstance.”).
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in their construction—being designed to produce relatively
small, clean explosions that are directional in nature—they simply are not intended to serve as weapons of any sort.95 (Because
of their very different design, these devices would likely be relatively easy to monitor, if that were desired.96)
The distinction between weapon and non-weapon grows out
of intent.97 A weapon is a tool used for harming someone.98
Without the element of harm, a tool is just a tool. Just as gasoline in the tank of a car is fuel, while flaming gasoline sprayed at
an enemy is a weapon, so too the nuclear explosives that power
an Orion spacecraft are fuel, not weapons.
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty recognizes this distinction by providing that military technology can be used in space
so long as it us used for peaceful purposes.99 Immediately after
the nuclear weapons provision quoted above, the Treaty provides: “The use of military personnel for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use
of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration
of the [M]oon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.”100 This “any equipment” provision reflects the understanding of the drafters that equipment originally designed for
military purposes often has capabilities that are useful in scientific research and exploration.
Thus, the nuclear explosives used to propel an Orion spacecraft are not prohibited because they are simply not weapons. As
Jack McCall writes, President John F. Kennedy summed up the
difference well: “When asked what the difference between the
Atlas rocket that launched astronaut John Glenn’s capsule and
the same nuclear-tipped Atlas missiles directed toward the Soviet
Union, JFK responded simply: ‘Attitude.’”101 Since the Treaty
See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 14, at 8; Nuclear Weapons Primer, WIS. PROJECT
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/DE2Y-L8WC] (describing creation of a massive nuclear
explosion for use as a weapon).
96 See generally Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://
world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safetyof-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx [https://perma.cc/7KPS-PZRZ] (Mar. 2022) (explaining ease of monitoring nuclear reactors).
97 See Weapon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98 Id.
99 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
100 Id.
101 Jack H. McCall, Jr., “The Inexorable Advance of Technology”?: American and International Efforts to Curb Missile Proliferation, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 387, 426 (1992).
95
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bans only nuclear weapons, nuclear explosives that are not
weapons would not be covered. The Outer Space Treaty’s explicit approval of “any equipment” that is “necessary for peaceful exploration” of space underscores the reasonableness of this
reading and perhaps also provides an independent ground for
regarding Orion spacecraft as permitted under the Treaty—if
an Orion spacecraft is necessary for peaceful exploration of
space and celestial bodies, then it “shall not be prohibited.”102
Thus, the nuclear-weapons language of Article IV does not ban
an Orion spacecraft, while the “any equipment” clause forbids
the banning of Orion spacecraft, which, given the tremendous
capabilities offered by Orion, certainly qualifies as necessary for
many kinds of space activity.103
VI.

PROBLEMS FOR ORION UNDER THE LIMITED TEST
BAN TREATY

The Test Ban Treaty may pose more problems for the deployment of an Orion vehicle than the Outer Space Treaty does.
Indeed, some years ago, Reynolds wrote with Robert P. Merges
that Orion experiments “were abandoned after the ratification
of the Test Ban Treaty, whose plain ban on ‘any nuclear weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion’ . . . in outer space
does not admit of any loophole that would support nuclear exGorove, supra note 94, at 115 (emphasis added).
A similar argument may be predicated on the language in paragraph two that allows the use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes. Thus, scientific research is regarded by the drafters as an activity basically of a peaceful character. This is the connotation that may reasonably be drawn
from the use of the phrase “for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes.” It may then be safe to assume that no scientific
research is prohibited by the Treaty regardless of whether or not it
is conducted by civilian or military personnel . . . The drafters of
the Treaty have indicated that scientific research should not be curtailed and realistically they have allowed the use of military personnel to further such research. It is reasonable to conclude that
regardless of its objective or where it takes place, scientific research
is favored by the Treaty terms.
Id. at 122.
103 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV. One is reminded of Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruminations on the meaning of “necessary”
versus “absolutely necessary” in the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 414–15 (1819).
102
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plosive propulsion.”104 This statement is not entirely incorrect,
but it turns out to be incomplete.
First, as noted at the time, many nations are not signatories to
the Test Ban Treaty.105 Most significantly, the People’s Republic
of China is a signatory but has not ratified the Treaty,106 and as
an up-and-coming space power with broad ambitions, China
seems like a likely candidate for deploying an Orion spaceship.
For non-signatory countries, the Test Ban Treaty, which certainly has not entered into customary international law in a way
that would bind non-signatories, poses no barrier at all.107
Second, of course, any party to the Test Ban Treaty may propose amendments thereto,108 or may simply withdraw upon the
giving of three months’ notice.109 A nation planning an Orion
launch might give such notice or simply ignore the waiting period and transmit its notice contemporaneously with a successful
launch—a procedural delict to be sure but one unlikely to result
in significant consequences.110
Most intriguingly, a nation might proceed to launch an Orion
spacecraft upon the principle that the Test Ban Treaty simply
GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW
POLICY 61 (2d ed. 1997) (alteration in original).
105 Id.;
see also Status of Signature and Ratification, CTBTO, https://
www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ [https://
perma.cc/FUG9-FYSG]; Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16.
106 CTBTO, supra note 105 (indicating that China has not ratified the Test Ban
Treaty).
107 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 104, at 61 (“Although ORION technology
is in some ways rather crude, its crudity may well be offset by its ability to deliver
extremely powerful propulsion with relatively few new technical demands, allowing a new space power (such as a third world country not bound by the Test
Ban Treaty) to perform impressive feats without developing the sophisticated
technologies possessed by more experienced space powers.”); see also CTBTO,
supra note 105.
108 Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, art. II. It is likely that the deployment of
Orion craft by non-signatories would lead to amendment of the Test Ban Treaty
among its signatories to permit an Orion craft, if not to outright abandonment of
the Test Ban Treaty. REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 104, at 61 (“Such uses by
countries not signatories to the Test Ban Treaty might well lead to an amendment of the treaty to allow its signatories to do the same—or to pressure on
nonsignatories to conform to its limits.”). How effective such pressures might be
against a nation like China is unclear.
109 Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, art. IV (“Each party shall in exercising its
national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to
all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.”).
110 See id.
104

AND

464

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

does not apply because of the “any equipment” language from
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty mentioned above. When
treaties conflict, the one that is ratified later in time controls.111
Thus, even a signatory to the Test Ban Treaty might argue that
its prohibitions were implicitly modified by the language of the
Outer Space Treaty permitting the use of “any equipment” that
is “necessary for peaceful exploration” and providing that the
use of such equipment “shall . . . not be prohibited.”112 Under
this reading of the Outer Space Treaty, the provisions of the
Test Ban Treaty remain in force, except to the extent that they
might “prohibit” use of “necessary” space technology such as
Orion. In that manner, even signatories to the Test Ban Treaty
would be free to proceed with Orion.
Though novel, this reading is not even a strained one. The
Test Ban Treaty was always primarily an environmental agreement, not an arms-control instrument.113 But what of the environmental consequences of an Orion launch from Earth?
VII.

FISSION AND FALLOUT

Any reference to the word nuclear tends to trigger fears of radiation and fallout.114 What kind of nuclear fallout is associated
with the launch of a nuclear spacecraft?
Orion is powered by nuclear explosions. A byproduct of nuclear explosions is ionizing radiation from atomic fission. Broken atoms continue to radioactively decay or emit particles of
varying sizes in the form of ionizing radiation in order to get to
an ideal stable state.115 When this happens with an atomic detonation on Earth, the result is typically radioactive dust called
111 Cf. Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 325 (2005) (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888)), (“This [last-in-time] doctrine holds that when a treaty and
federal statute conflict, whichever was enacted last in time controls.”); Taylor v.
Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855)).
112 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
113 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 104, at 54 (“The primary goal of the Limited Test Ban Treaty was not arms control, but the prevention of global nuclear
contamination.”); see also Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, pmbl. (noting that this
Treaty sought to contribute to the protection of the environment). This testing
was quite a problem during the era of unlimited atmospheric nuclear testing. See
generally Nuclear Testing: 1945-2009, CTBTO, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/ [https://perma.cc/
V9N4-FJM2].
114 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
115 Radioactive Decay, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/radiation/radioactive-decay [https://perma.cc/H66W-FDPQ] (Apr. 12, 2022).
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“fallout” that settles at varying distances downwind.116 The fallout continues its radioactive decay, and the fallout and its decay
ionize atoms and molecules, thus destabilizing them or, in the
presence of fissile material, possibly generating further fission
reactions.117 When this ionizing radiation interacts with a target,
atoms within the target can become ionized and possibly break
apart.118 These reactions with live tissue (humans) are the kind
of interactions that cause unwanted and harmful biological
effects.119
At the time Orion was developed, any resulting radioactivity
seemed unimportant. In those days, the nuclear powers were engaging in frequent nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the
oceans, and even sometimes in outer space,120 and the amount
of fallout Orion would have contributed to the Earth’s environment would have been a tiny fraction of what was already being
produced. As Freeman Dyson writes, “We calculated that even
our most ambitious program of Orion flights would add only
about one percent to the contamination of the environment
that the bomb tests were then causing. One percent did not
seem so bad.”121
Today, that baseline of massive worldwide atmospheric testing
no longer exists. To many, any amount of radioactivity, however
116 See, e.g., Fallout, OXFORD LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.oxfordlearn
ersdictionaries.com/definition/american_english/fallout [https://perma.cc/
39V9-P949].
117 See Fissile Material, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fissile-material.html [https://perma.cc/J8SE9V4S] (Mar. 9, 2021) (defining “fissile material”); see generally J.A.B. Gibson &
D.H. Peirson, Radiation Dose and Ionization from Radioactive Fallout, 220 NATURE
464, 464–66 (1968) (describing expected doses of ionizing radiation from nuclear fallout).
118 See generally EPA, supra note 115.
119 See JAMES E. TURNER, ATOMS, RADIATION, AND RADIATION PROTECTION
362–63 (3d ed. 2007).
120 See, e.g., 9 July 1962: ‘Starfish Prime,’ Outer Space, CTBTO, https://
www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-july-1962starfish-prime-outer-space
[https://perma.cc/7AK7-QV57] (“On 9 July 1962, the United States conducted
the ‘Starfish Prime’ nuclear test, one of a series of five aimed at testing the effects
of nuclear weapons in high altitudes [and] lower outer space.”); see also Jessica
Miley, Cold War Nuclear Tests Still Affecting Life at the Bottom of the Ocean, INTERESTING ENG’G (May 17, 2019) (internal citation omitted), https://interestingengineering.com/cold-war-nuclear-tests-still-affecting-life-at-the-bottom-of-theocean [https://perma.cc/J8ED-UT9P] (“Animals living in the deepest trenches
of the ocean carry radioactive carbon from nuclear tests carried out during the
Cold War.”).
121 FREEMAN DYSON, supra note 53, at 114–15.
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low, is unacceptable.122 And even Dyson and his cohorts were
troubled by the deaths that might result: “I studied carefully the
literature concerning the biological effects of radiation and arrived at estimates that the fallout from each Orion takeoff would
statistically cause between one-tenth and one human death by
radiation-induced cancer.”123 Radiation-induced cancers depend on a number of factors: length of exposure, dose of exposure, type of exposure, the person’s age at the time of exposure,
and tissue penetration—just to name a few.124 Acute radiation
poisoning is evident within days, but latent effects from lower
level radiation exposure may take years to appear, making direct
correlations between exposure and cancer extremely difficult to
prove.125
Dyson’s sensitivity does him credit, though it is perhaps ironic
in someone who engaged in nuclear weapons research, a field
where “megadeaths”—millions of deaths—are a standard metric.126 The worst nuclear “accident”127 at Chernobyl led to thirty
deaths within the first few weeks and over 6,000 cases of thyroid

122 See generally Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Fact Sheet: Radiation in Everyday Life, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/radlife (noting that exposure to high doses of radiation is harmful to human health, but
there is less scientific certainty about the health effects of exposure to low doses).
123 Id. at 115.
124 See generally COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION
(BIER V), NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS
OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V 5–6 (1990) (describing risk factors that cause
radiation exposure to be more or less carcinogenic).
125 See DONALD J. PECK & EHSAN SAMEI, HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND COMMUNICATE RADIATION RISK 3–5, https://www.imagewisely.org/-/media/Image-Wisely/
Files/CT/IW-Peck-Samei-Radiation-Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWL8-AEGX]
(Mar. 2017).
126 See
Megadeath, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
megadeath [https://perma.cc/2VMU-JGXC] (“[A] unit of one million deaths:
used in estimating or predicting the fatalities that would occur in a nuclear
war.”); HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 169 (2007) (“It was difficult for
people to distinguish in the early 1950’s between 2 million deaths and 100 million deaths.”).
127 The RBMK-type reactors used at Chernobyl were fundamentally flawed and
unsafe. See Bethel Afework, Jordan Hanania, Kailyn Stenhouse & Jason Donev,
RMBK, ENERGY EDUC., https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/RBMK [https:/
/perma.cc/A8HW-J35P] (July 21, 2018). The combination of an unsafe reactor
incorrectly operated might be better termed extreme negligence or reckless conduct. See Chernobyl Accident 1986, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobylaccident.aspx [https://perma.cc/FF56-ES3R] (Apr. 2022).
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cancer by the year 2005.128 By today’s standards, an estimated
one death per launch might seem unacceptable on its face. But
compared to deaths from existing modes of transportation,129
Orion fallout would have a trivial impact.
VIII.

CURRENT CONSEQUENCES FROM
TRANSPORTATION

When comparing these numbers to health statistics associated
with commonly accepted means of transportation, the fallout
numbers begin to look quite negligible. For example, approximately 38,000 premature deaths per year globally are attributed
to Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) from vehicular diesel exhaust gas
emissions.130 This impact is particularly felt in Europe, where
11,500 out of 28,500 deaths per year are linked to NOx emissions from diesel vehicle engines.131 Although the mighty diesel
is most likely on its way out,132 there are still approximately 15
million diesel vehicles driving around the Federal Republic of
Germany,133 an ironic risk given the country’s decision to shut
down its nuclear reactors after Fukushima.134 If diesel engine
use continues, this number could increase worldwide to 183,600
premature deaths per year.135
Other studies paint a direr picture, estimating 385,000 global
premature deaths in 2015 from vehicles (diesel and gasoline),
stationary engines, and ships.136 Massive container ships are exAssessments of the Radiation Effects from the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Accident,
U.N. SCI. COMM. ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, https://
www.unscear.org/unscear/en/areas-of-work/chernobyl.html [https://perma.cc/
685H-9DME].
129 See infra Part VIII.
130 Diesel Fumes Lead to Thousands More Deaths than Thought, NEW SCIENTIST &
PRESS ASS’N (May 15, 2017), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2131067-diesel-fumes-lead-to-thousands-more-deaths-than-thought/ [https://perma.cc/JT2VWEJZ].
131 Id.
132 See Robert Ferris, Diesel Is on the Decline, but Don’t Count It out Yet, CNBC
(June 19, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/19/diesel-is-on-thedecline-but-dont-count-it-out-yet.html.
133 Paul Hockenos, End of the Road: Are Diesel Cars on the Way Out in Europe?,
YALE ENV’T 360 (Apr. 12, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/end-of-the-roadare-diesel-cars-on-the-way-out-in-europe [https://perma.cc/GG6U-3MXR].
134 See Germany: To Phase Out or Not to Phase Out? Phase Out!, K=1 PROJECT: CTR.
FOR NUCLEAR STUD., COLUMB. (Aug. 1, 2012), https://k1project.columbia.edu/
a13 [https://perma.cc/MDD7-B52D].
135 NEW SCIENTIST & PRESS ASS’N, supra note 130.
136 Dan Rutherford & Josh Miller, Silent but Deadly: The Case of Shipping Emissions, INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://theicct.org/
128
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treme offenders; particulate from these container ships creates
massive amounts of sulfur dioxide, which leads to acid rain.137
Although such ships are subject to country-specific restrictions
while at port, once on the high seas, these ships burn heavy and
dirty fuel, spewing far more particulate than any internal combustion engine on land.138 This heavy fuel is 3,500 times dirtier
than automotive diesel,139 and we have already pointed to the
health implications associated with diesel engines. A 2007 study
estimated that up to 60,000 deaths annually were linked to shipping emissions, with a further estimation that the number would
increase 40% by 2012.140 Given the heavy reliance on ocean liners and online shopping, those numbers have increased more
than the 2007 study projected and are getting worse.141
Those transportation risks are associated with inhalation of
toxins from fossil fuels, but air travel also results in radiation
exposure.142 Our atmosphere on earth at sea level protects us
from cosmic radiation—the higher you go, the thinner the atmosphere, and the less the protection.143 For example, residents
of the Mile High City of Denver, Colorado, experience higher
blog/staff/silent-deadly-case-shipping-emissions [https://perma.cc/284HYU5N].
137 Harald Franzen, Think Diesel Cars Are Dirty? Try Ships!, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/think-diesel-cars-are-dirty-try-ships/a40278610 [https://perma.cc/S5GF-CNGD].
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 James J. Corbett, James J. Winebrake, Erin H. Green, Prasad Kasibhatla,
Veronika Eyring & Axel Lauer, Mortality from Ship Emissions: A Global Assessment, 41
ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 8512, 8514–15 (2007).
141 See Mark Dwortzan, Smarter Regulation of Global Shipping Emissions Could Improve Air Quality and Health Outcomes, MIT NEWS (Aug. 17, 2021), https://
news.mit.edu/2021/smarter-regulation-global-shipping-emissions-could-improveair-quality-health-outcomes-0817 [https://perma.cc/GSQ5-SYGV] (reporting
that 94,000 premature deaths were associated with maritime shipping in 2015
and that “[e]missions from shipping activities around the world account for
nearly 3 percent of total human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, and could increase by up to 50 percent by 2050”).
142 Radiation from Air Travel, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/
air_travel.html (Dec. 7, 2015) [https://perma.cc/LMC8-J83A]; see also Doses in
Our Daily Lives, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
radiation/around-us/doses-daily-lives.html [https://perma.cc/Y6H8-LSP5] (Apr.
26, 2022).
143 Cosmic Radiation, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/radtown/cosmic-radiation#:~:text=TO%20learn%20more-,About%20Cosmic%20Radiation,the%20radiation%20around%20the%20earth [https://perma.cc/PA3U-F4ZU] (May 16,
2022).
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radiation exposure.144 Flying at a typical altitude exposes a person to approximately 0.003 millisieverts per hour.145 A sievert is
a unit of radiation measurement that takes into account the biological effects of radiation—low-level radiation exposure is not
likely to interact significantly with tissue, whereas high levels of
radiation exposure is.146 Think radio wave versus x-ray. So,
spending 100 hours on a plane per year results in an excess exposure of 0.3 mSv per year. For comparison, an average American is exposed to 0.062 mSv in a year (i.e., with background
radiation, standard medical procedures, etc.).147 Exposure to 1
Sv increases the risk of cancer by about 5%,148 so over a 10-year
period, simply flying an average of 100 hours per year can increase your risk of cancer by 0.015%. Assuming a population of
about three billion in 1960 and Dyson’s rough estimate of one
human death per launch, it is clear that risk of cancer from
commercial air travel can far outweigh the estimated risk from
an Orion launch.
Now that we have established that risk to humans based on
fallout from an Orion launch is insignificant in the face of existing transportation risks, let us turn to methods of fallout
reduction.
IX. FALLOUT REDUCTION
Fallout is generated by the rocket’s propulsion—radiation
born at the explosion location will primarily be located between
the explosion location and the pusher plate.149 According to
General Atomics, most fission products would not be trapped
within Earth’s atmosphere due to their hemispherical escape
path around the vehicle and their extremely high velocity.150
144 Biological Effects of Radiation, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N (Dec. 2004),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=28420 [https://perma.cc/VL9H-QBJQ].
145 Timothy J. Jorgensen, Air Travel Exposes You to Radiation – How Much Health
Risk Comes with It?, CONVERSATION (June 7, 2017, 10:37 PM), https://theconversation.com/air-travel-exposes-you-to-radiation-how-much-health-risk-comes-with-it78790 [https://perma.cc/2639-6TFH].
146 See generally Measuring Radiation, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/health-effects/measuring-radiation.html
[https://perma.cc/G7UL-TF4Q] (Mar. 20, 2022).
147 U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 142.
148 See PECK & SAMEI, supra note 125.
149 See GEN. ATOMIC DIV., GEN. DYNAMICS, Nuclear Pulse Space Vehicle Study: Conceptual Vehicle Designs and Operational Systems § 3.1.1 (Sept. 19, 1964), https://
www.classe.cornell.edu/~seb/celestia/orion/files/19770085619_1977085619.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RQ5-3AAC].
150 Id. § 5.1.2.
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Nevertheless, General Atomics estimated that some radiation
would still be trapped in the atmosphere and travel to Earth’s
surface, although “in times less than the [S]trontium[-]90 halflife.”151 Strontium-90’s half-life is about 29.1 years, and it is a
beta emitter (electron or positron)—a form of ionizing radiation, which can damage living tissue.152
One way to reduce fallout would be to direct the fission products in the direction of the vehicle as it travels out of the Earth’s
atmosphere.153 Another way to reduce or even avoid fallout generated would be to launch the nuclear rocket using chemical
rockets to an altitude sufficient to reduce nuclear material
caught in the Earth’s atmosphere.154 Generally, fission products
would not be trapped in the atmosphere at an altitude of 150
km.155 As we have noted above with regard to Orion, the bigger
the better,156 but launching a huge nuclear rocket with our current chemical boosters might seem counterproductive. General
Atomics, however, accounted for such inefficiencies and suggested that a massive nuclear rocket would nevertheless need to
be constructed in orbit, and efficiencies gained overall would
most likely outweigh any detriment to such a scheme.157
Redirection of fission products and assembly of the unit in
outer space are estimated to reduce fission-product trappage in
the atmosphere on the order of 10-6,158 but launch of the rocket
from Earth generates another type of fallout, known as
groundburst, that is associated with contamination of ground
material that is pulled in at launch, irradiated, and spewed elsewhere.159 One suggestion to cure this includes use of an extremely thick launchpad,160 but it seems that the most logical
Id.
Radioisotope Brief: Strontium-90 (Sr-90), CDC (Aug. 18, 2005), https://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/isotopes/pdf/strontium.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X3P5Z48].
153 See GEN. ATOMIC DIV., GEN. DYNAMICS, supra note 149, § 5.1.2.
154 Id. § 5.5.2.
155 Id. § 5.1.2.
156 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
157 See id. § 5.5.2.
158 Id. § 5.1.2.
159 Cf. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR EARTH-PENETRATOR AND
OTHER WEAPONS 92 (2005) (discussing this type of fallout in the context of nuclear weapons).
160 See Wayne Smith, The Case for Orion, SPACE DAILY (Mar. 12, 2003), https://
www.spacedaily.com/news/nuclearspace-03h.html [https://perma.cc/NL7JP7H9] (“It[‘]s as straightforward as that. The Orion team discovered that a thick
metal plate can withstand close proximity nuclear blasts very well.”).
151
152
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suggestion is to assemble the nuclear rocket in space. Indeed,
this seems to be NASA’s current approach for nuclear
transport.161
The authors of the General Atomics study also suggest a complete redesign to eliminate fission-product release.162 One redesign includes the use of fusion instead of fission. Whereas the
use of fission harnesses atomic energy through breaking atomic
bonds, the use of fusion harnesses the energy through its release
upon fusing particles together—fission releases atomic binding
energy from a large nucleus while fusion releases excess binding
energy no longer needed from individual atoms.163 Although
the sun is very successful at fusion, humans have had less success
replicating this clean energy source on Earth. Recent promising
breakthroughs indicate that this could be a viable option, albeit
expensive,164 but for the purposes of this Article, we will assume
the nuclear-pulsed rocket is propelled by fission reactions.
X.

FALLOUT AS “CONTAMINATION” UNDER THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY
Aside from its limitations on nuclear weapons in orbit,165 the
Outer Space Treaty, in Article IX, requires that parties avoid
“harmful contamination” of the Moon and other celestial bodies, and possibly also of outer space itself.166 The latter is not
clear. The precise language is, “States Parties to the Treaty shall
pursue studies of outer space, including the [M]oon and other
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid
their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter.”167
161 See, e.g., Elizabeth Howell, US Military Wants Nuclear Rocket Ideas for Missions.
Near the Moon, SPACE.COM (May 10, 2022), https://www.space.com/darpa-nuclear-rocket-earth-moon-space.
162 See GEN. ATOMIC DIV., GEN. DYNAMICS, supra note 149, § 2.4.
163 See Matthew Lanctot, DOE Explains . . . Nuclear Fusion Reactions, OFF. OF SCI.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/science/doe-explainsnuclear-fusion-reactions [https://perma.cc/L5VR-ZAN3]; Nuclear Explained, U.S. Energy
Info. Admin. https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/nuclear/ (July 7, 2022).
164 See David Abel, After Years of Doubts, Hopes Grow That Nuclear Fusion Is Finally
for Real and Could Help Address Climate Change, BOS. GLOBE, https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2021/12/22/science/after-years-doubts-hopes-grow-thatnuclear-fusion-is-finally-real-could-help-address-climate-change/ [https://
perma.cc/4BWM-TNPP] (Dec. 22, 2021, 5:46 PM).
165 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
166 Id. art. IX.
167 Id.

472

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

This raises two questions. First, does the prohibition on harmful contamination apply to outer space as well as to the Moon
and other celestial bodies? Second, does radioactive fallout from
Orion count as harmful contamination?
It is clear from its language that the prohibition has no application to any sort of contamination that takes place entirely on
Earth, so atmospheric fallout from an Orion launch would not
be covered. Do the “them” and “their” in Article IX apply to
both outer space and to the Moon and other celestial bodies, or
do they apply solely to the latter? Both interpretations seem
plausible, but which one is more plausible?
Discussions of contamination under Article IX generally seem
to turn on biological contamination—the contamination of, say,
Mars with Earth bacteria, or the “back contamination” of Earth
with alien life brought here from another planet.168 Article IX
provides no definition of “contamination” or “harmful,”169 leaving us to fall back on general meanings. Those are not clear, but
for the provision to apply to Orion, it must cover outer space,
and whatever radioactive emissions produced by Orion while it
is operating beyond the atmosphere must count as “contamination” for the purposes of the Treaty.170 As a general matter, the
notion of “contaminating” outer space with radiation is an absurdity—outer space is immense beyond imagining and generally features levels of radiation that would be lethal on Earth. It
is possible that sufficient radioactive exhaust might be trapped
within the Earth’s magnetic fields to produce local contamination, but to the extent that happens, such would represent contamination of Earth (and not with “extraterrestrial matter,” the
only kind recognized by the Treaty as a harm to Earth), rather
than outer space or the Moon and other celestial bodies, and
hence would fall outside the Treaty.171 And, of course, radioac168 See Louis de Gouyon Matignon, Harmful Contamination, Harmful Interference
and Space Debris, SPACE LEGAL ISSUES (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.
com/harmful-contamination-harmful-interference-and-space-debris/ [https://
perma.cc/4MDY-ZCXJ] (describing “harmful contamination” as involving “biological contamination of a planetary body by a space probe or spacecraft”). For a
popular discussion, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Why I Hope There’s No Life on
Mars, POPULAR MECHS. (Dec. 3, 2008), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
space/moon-mars/a3778/4294346/ [https://perma.cc/8UR9-BX9Q].
169 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15; see also Reynolds, supra note 69, at 77
(noting that the “Outer Space Treaty only bans ‘harmful contamination’” and
that not all contamination is likely to be harmful).
170 See Reynolds, supra note 69, at 77.
171 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX.
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tive contamination is not “biological contamination,” which
seems to be what Article IX envisions. While the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, the “harmful contamination” language
would not appear to prevent the operation of an Orion spacecraft. At the very least, as we have illustrated, there would be
many plausible arguments that an Orion-launching nation
could deploy in defense of its launch, with the likely result being, at most, a dispute among jurists.
Also arguing against the “harmful contamination” language’s
application to outer space, even near-Earth space, is that one
harmful form of pollution in near Earth space—orbital debris—
has not been seen as triggering this provision.172 Though
NASA’s Administrator Bill Nelson sharply criticized a recent
Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) test that generated copious space
debris, threatening satellites and the International Space Station, his statement did not even mention the Outer Space
Treaty.173 This would also seem to undercut the application of
other Article IX provisions requiring States Parties to be guided
by “the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance,” to conduct all their activities in outer space “with due regard to the
corresponding interests” of other Party States, and to consult
before any activity that might cause “harmful interference” with
other nations’ activities in space.174 Again, this provision was not
referenced in complaints about the Russian ASAT test,175 suggesting that NASA does not regard the provision as applicable
here. (Presumably, the Russians, by their actions, have indicated
a similar sentiment.) It thus seems unlikely that the “harmful
contamination” or “harmful interference” provisions of Article
172 See Michael B. Runnels, On Clearing Earth’s Orbital Debris & Enforcing the
Outer Space Treaty in the U.S., AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 13, 2022), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2022/01/orbitaldebris/ [https://perma.cc/3GYE-SNES] (“[N]either the [Outer Space Treaty]
nor [the] Liability Convention compellingly disincentivize debris creation in
orbit.”).
173 See Hanneke Weitering, NASA Chief Bill Nelson Condemns Russian Anti-Satellite
Test, SPACE.COM (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.space.com/nasa-chief-condemnsrussian-anti-satellitw-test [https://perma.cc/JV7D-WKTS]; see also Christopher J.
Borgen, Russia’s ASAT Test and the Development of Space Law, LIEBER INST., WEST
POINT (Nov. 21, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-asat-test-development-space-law/ [https://perma.cc/H3HZ-XAAJ] (“[W]hile various public statements by States characterized the [Russian ASAT] test as reckless or dangerous,
language explicitly framing it as a violation of the [Outer Space Treaty] seems to
be lacking.”).
174 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX.
175 See Borgen, supra note 173.
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IX would be widely seen as applying to any pollution caused by
an Orion launch, on or off the Earth.
Likewise, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention)176 might
conceivably apply to harm done by an Orion launch, both on
Earth and in space. The Liability Convention applies to both
military and civilian activity in space and provides for the absolute liability of launching states for damage caused by their
space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in
flight.177 The Liability Convention also provides for liability
based on fault where the damage is to space objects of another
launching state elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth.178
The harm caused by fallout on Earth would appear too diffuse
to fall under the Liability Convention—how does one assess
damages for a random life, or fraction of a life, lost to cancer
from fallout radiation amid all the other deaths for cancer in
the same population? Though there is (some) precedent for the
Liability Convention being applied in the case of radiation harm
on Earth caused by a spacecraft, the circumstances involved the
crash of a reactor-equipped Soviet spy satellite, which is pretty
much at the core of the Liability Convention’s coverage.179 As
for harm to other space objects, liability based on fault requires
some sort of standard of fault (i.e., negligence),180 and determining what constitutes reasonable care in launching a new variety of nuclear-powered spacecraft would be difficult. In some
cases—for example, where an out-of-control Orion craft rams
into a space station or satellite—liability would be easy to assess.
But those kinds of cases would be independent of the nuclear
nature of the Orion craft.
Aside from these arguments, it is possible to imagine more
general environmental arguments made against the fallout from
an Orion launch, not drawing on the Test Ban Treaty or the
Outer Space Treaty at all. Those arguments are unlikely to go
very far, however, because international environmental law does
176 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
177 Id. art. II.
178 Id. art. III.
179 See Alexander F. Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 78, 78–81 (1984) (describing the facts of the satellite
accident and explaining the legal consequences for the Soviet Union).
180 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault
and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744–46 (2016).
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not itself go very far. The fact that a treaty was needed to put an
end to atmospheric tests by most powers—and that some nations that refused to join the Treaty continued to perform atmospheric tests without penalty—illustrates that there is no
general international law norm against fallout. Such arguments,
like any arguments, may be made in the public sphere, but they
are unlikely to carry much weight.
XI.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As Walter MacDougall has noted, space law began with a
struggle between the “natural law” school of space law, associated with early space lawyer (and President of the International
Astronautical Federation) Andrew Haley, and the “positivist
school” associated with Myres McDougal of Yale Law School.181
It is fair to say that the positivist school won out.182 McDougal’s
approach to international jurisprudence held that norms can be
determined only from patterns of common usage and from the
expectations and actions of national elites.183
Viewing the legal issues surrounding an Orion launch in
those terms, the discussion above indicates that there are no serious legal barriers to the deployment of an Orion spacecraft or,
at least, no barriers serious enough to deter a nation otherwise
determined to take advantage of Orion capabilities from doing
so. International law is, of course, real law but it is law whose
sanctions tend to be weak and diffuse.184 The cost to a nation of
violating international norms tends to be small, unless those
norms are very strong ones.185 And nations are willing to face
some costs in pursuit of what they see as important objectives.186
To a nation determined to achieve primacy in space, the
Orion drive offers a very powerful tool for achieving that objecMCDOUGALL, supra note 81, at 188.
Id. (“The two schools could aptly be termed the idealist and the realist. The
most striking vindication of the realistic positivists was the fact that the secret
NSC decisions had already rendered the space law debate academic . . . Many
space law theorists expressed their disgust with this narrow nationalism and hypocrisy, but their cries of ‘space for peace’ and ‘space for all mankind’ carried no
further than if they had been shouted in the vacuum of space itself. The irony is
that those enthusiastic about the human adventure in space should have been
rejoicing. Competition was the engine of spaceflight.”).
183 Id.
184 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2631–36 (1997).
185 See generally id. at 2600–01, 2631–36.
186 Id. at 2635–36.
181
182
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tive. While there are legal arguments against the deployment of
an Orion spacecraft,187 they are not particularly strong arguments, and for each such argument, there seems to be a
counterargument that is at least as plausible. In those circumstances, the legal cost of going forward likely seems to be very
manageable.
Those concerned with limiting the deployment of Orion or—
perhaps more sensibly and achievably—with ensuring that nations that deploy it do so in as safe and considerate a manner as
possible, should probably seek to establish general principles of
safety and considerateness that go beyond the very limited provisions of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and of the Liability
Convention. Establishing a norm of liability for harm caused by
deliberately created debris, as in the case of the recent Russian
ASAT test, might establish a useful precedent.188 It is not clear to
us that there is a strong desire to do any of these things on the
part of the international community, but that might change.
At any rate, as things stand, we face a future in which enthusiasm for nuclear pulse propulsion is likely to grow along with the
intensity of competition for space resources and national prestige, and one in which international law is unlikely to stand as a
significant barrier to such developments. Indeed, the enthusiasm for nuclear pulse propulsion may not be limited to governments, as figures such as Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk lead the way
in many areas of space development.189 Those wishing to see
187 Leonardo P. Caselli, Space Demilitarization Treaties in a New Era of Manned
Nuclear Spaceflights, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 641, 642, 654 (2012).
188 For a discussion on problems with current space law regarding orbital debris, and some suggestions for improvement, see Robert P. Merges & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Rules of the Road for Space?: Satellite Collisions and the Inadequacy of Current
Space Law, 40 ENV’T L. REP. 10009, 10010–11 (2010).
189 George Dyson’s book even received a strong positive Amazon review from
none other than Amazon founder (as well as space-colonization enthusiast and
founder of private space company Blue Origin) Jeff Bezos. See Jeff Bezos, Review
for Project Orion: The True Story of the Atomic Spaceship, AMAZON (Apr. 14, 2002),
https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1PUHS86W2V5F4/ref=cm_cr
_getr_d_rvw_ttl?ots=1&ie=UTF8&ASIN=0805072845 [https://perma.cc/S7RJVJDB]. Bezos wrote: “For those of us who dream of visiting the outer planets,
seeing Saturn’s rings up close without intermediation of telescopes or chargecoupled devices, well, we pretty much *have* to read ‘Project Orion.’ In 1958,
some of the world’s smartest people, including famous physicist Freeman Dyson
(the author’s father), expected to visit the outer planets in ‘Orion,’ a nuclearbomb propelled ship big enough and powerful enough to seat its passengers in
lazy-boy recliners. They expected to start their grand tour by 1970. This was not
pie-in-the-sky optimism; they had strong technical reasons for believing they
could do it. To pull this book together, George Dyson did an astonishing amount

2022]

PULSED NUCLEAR SPACE PROPULSION

477

limits on Orion-type spacecraft would be well advised to seek
new international agreements rather than rely on treaties from
the mid-20th Century.
of research into this still largely classified project. And, maybe because he’s connected to Orion through his father, the author captures the strong emotion of
the project and the team. Highly recommended.” Id.

